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Abstract 
The paper shows that interjurisdictional competition for mobile factors of 
production forces the government to raise the efficiency of the public sector and, thus, 
helps to tame Leviathan governments. However, this result is derived under some 
restrictive assumptions concerning the kind of tax policy used by the government. In the 
case of benefit taxes, e.g. user charges, a Leviathan may be tamed by interjurisdictional 
competition whereas this is not necessarily true in the case of lum-sum taxes. 
JEL categories F20, H21, H40, H73  
 
1 Introduction 
Most models in public economics are based on the assumption that the 
government of a jurisdiction has the objective of maximising the welfare of its 
constituency. Moreover, it is claimed that the public sector uses its budget efficiently. 
Neither of these assumptions is realistic. Governments and public-sector bureaucrats 
follow their own goals and they waste resources. To some extent, this behaviour is re-
stricted by the democratic process. Selfish and wasteful governments can be punished  
by the voter in the elections. However, as Downs [2] has argued, voters are rationally 
ignorant and are only imperfectly informed what is going on in politics. Thus, 
governments and public bureaucracies are, at least to some extent, able to improve the 
well-being of their members at the expense of the well-being of the voters.  
                         
*   This paper has benefited considarably from comments by Jan K. Brueckner and an anaonymous 
referee of the Journal of Urban Economics. The usual disclaimer applies.   2
It has been argued in the literature that there is another, perhaps more efficient, 
way to limit the discretionary power of governments: openness of the economy for 
mobile factors of production. See Brennan and Buchanan [1], ch. 9.2, but also Drèze [3] 
and Giersch [6]. The basic argument is the following one. The government is   
responsible for the provision of the infrastructural and institutional framework in which 
economic activities take place. If it is inefficient, i.e. if it provides low-quality services 
but charges high taxes, mobile factors are driven out of the country. This leads to a 
decline in income and employment of the immobile factors. The voters will be worse  
off and they will punish the government by electing other parties or candidates. But  
since the government is interested in being re-elected, it is forced to act and increase the 
jurisdiction's attractivity to mobile factors of production. This requires lower taxes and/or 
better public services. Thus, the part of the budget spent by the public sector for its own 
well-being must shrink. The Leviathan is tamed.  
If this argument is correct, then factor mobility can repair a major deficiency of 
the system of representative democracy. Not only is the allocation of the private factors 
of production improved by increased mobility, there is also a productivity gain in the  
public sector. The resource-wasting Leviathan is turned into a leaner state that satisfies  
its constituency’s needs in a more efficient way.1 This is an interesting result and it has  
                         
1   There are alternative, less optimistic, notions of the lean state. Hans-Werner Sinn [12] looks at 
situations where a benevolent state corrects market failures and privides public goods that are not 
supplied optimally by unregulated competitive markets. If competion is re-introduced, now on the 
level of jurisdictions, market failures are re-untroduced as well. Governments are forced to reduce 
their public-goods supply to inefficiently low levels. Sinn’s [12] examples for such undesirable 
outcomes of interjurisdictional competition are the public provision of social insurance and product 
quality standards. In both cases regulation is reduced to sub-optimal levels if jurisdictions compete 
with another.    3
important policy implications. None the less, one does not find much about this 
hypothesis in the literature. Related questions have been addressed by Epple and   
Zelenitz [5] and by Edwards and Keen [4], but the only papers dealing with the 
hypothesis itself are those by Sinn [12] and Rauscher [11]. Sinn's [12] analysis is   
based on a diagrammatical exposition rather than on a formal model. It is shown that  
the public sector of a jurisdiction is forced to reduce its taxes if other jurisdictions offer 
better combinations of tax rates and public-sector services. But it is not shown that the 
other jurisdictions have incentives to do so. Moreover, Sinn's paper is rather vague on 
what the tax base is and on how the taxes collected from the mobile factor of production 
are used. Thus, this paper presents some good arguments for a taming of Leviathan, but  
it does not provide a formal proof. Rauscher [11] uses a formal model and shows that  
the argument, though plausible, is not always consistent. If the mobile factor of 
production is the tax base, it is possible that public-sector efficiency declines when   
factor mobility is increased. In the present paper, I take a slightly different approach  
and look at benefit taxes as the instrument. Examples are road pricing schemes, 
environmental taxes, and all kinds of fees that are paid for public-sector services.  
2. The Model 
Imagine a world consisting of many small identical jurisdictions.2 There are   
three factors of production. One factor (land or labour) is taken as given and constant 
and, therefore, it is not modelled explicitly. In each jurisdiction, there is another 
immobile  
but variable factor of production, g, which is supplied by the government. It may be  
thought of as infrastructure or institutional capital. The third factor is private capital, 
which is mobile across jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction is endowed with a stock k0 and it  
 
                         
2   This assumption makes the analysis relatively convenient and it allows to separate the effects of  
tax competition from those of changes in the allocation of the mobile factor of production.   4
employs  k. Ex ante, k0 and k may differ but ex post they are equal because the 
jurisdictions are identical and all governments choose the same policies. The production 
function exhibits constant returns to scale. 
An aggregate good is produced. This good can be used for consumption   
purposes but also as the public-sector input. Thus, each unit of g  costs one unit of 
consumption - if the government does not waste tax revenues. Let the production   
function have constant returns to scale. Due to the assumption that some factors are  
constant, the production function can be represented by f (k,g) where f(.,.) exhibits 
decreasing returns to scale in (k,g).3 Moreover, let it have the usual properties (positive 
partial derivatives and negative second derivatives). The sign of the cross derivative,  
fkg, is indeterminate in the case of decreasing returns to scale. Moreover, the function is 
strictly concave in (k,g). Thus,  . Subscripts denote partial derivatives.  0 2 > − kg gg kk f f f
The tax revenue consists of two components. One of them is a lump-sum tax, t0. 
The other one is a user charge or fee on the public good. Let this fee be t. Then t0+tg is 
the tax revenue. Domestic producers have to pay for the factors they hire from abroad. 
With r being the remuneration, r (k-k0) is the income going to foreigners. Ex post, this 
turns out to be zero, but ex ante it matters. Thus the consumable private income in this 
economy is 
y  =  f(k,g) - t0 - tg - r (k-k0).   (1) 
A benevolent government would maximise y or – if calital is mobile and footloose – the 
income of the immobile factor, y-rk
0. Note, however, that both r and k
0 are given and  
                         
3   It is known from empirical analyses that the elasticities of output with respect to private and public 
capital are approximately one third and less than 0.2, respectively. See Gramlich [7] for a survey  
and Holtz-Eakin [8] for recent estimates. Only if the additional factors of production are taken into 
account, will the sum of output elesticities add up to one.   5
For a Leviathan government, y is just one of the arguments of its objective function. It 
may be interpreted a proxy for political support. The other argument of the Leviathan's 
objective function is the reant it can appropriate due to voter ignorance. In the model, this 
rent is t0+tg-g, i.e. the part of the tax revenue which is not spent to provide public-sector 
services. Note that this is not a budget surplus but the consumption of the public sector 
itself. Political support and the government's rent income are the arguments of a quasi-
concave utility function:  
u(t0+tg-g , f(k,g) - t0 - tg - r (k-k0)).  (2) 
Edwards and Keen [4] use the same type of utility function. It is a drastically reduced 
form of a complex political process. In particular, I have not modelled the interactions  
of the government and the bureaucracy explicitly. For a model doing this, see Moene 
[9]. Moreover, one may think of additional arguments of a Leviathan's utility function, 
e.g. the size of the budget or the level of public-sector activity. See Niskanen [10] and 
Moene [9]. This is, however, not done here since I wish to concentrate on the waste of 
resources in my analysis. For the sake of convenience, the arguments of the functions 
will be dropped in what follows.  
The capital  market is assumed to be perfectly competitive and this implies  
fk  =  r.     (3) 
If the capital is immobile, k is given and r is determined in the domestic capital market.  
If capital is mobile, r is given and k is the endogenous variable. 
Government behavior can be modelled in three ways. One possibility is to look  
at a situation where the government sets a tax rate or user fee and leaves it to the market 
to decide how much of the g good is demanded by the private sector. Alternatively, one 
may assume that the government fixes a level of g and auctions user permits such that  
the market determines the price of a permit, t. The final option is to assume that the  
 
government offers a (t,g) package - subject to the constraint that profits do not become   6
negative. It is known that the taxation and the tradable-permits schemes are equivalent  
if markets are perfectly competitive. Moreover, one can show that the package approach 
leads to the same result in the case of constant returns to scale.4 Thus it is sufficient to 
look at one of these cases and I chose the firs one, where the government just sets taxes. 
The relationship between g and t is given by 
fg  =  t.    (4) 
What is the effect of a change in the tax rate on the supply of the public good? In autarky, 













    (5) 
If capital is mobile, it has to be taken into account that the capital stock is determined by 

















    (6) 
The results are expected. High fees reduce the demand for public-sector services. 

















    (7) 
                         
4   If the condition of non negative profits is binding, we have f(k,g) = rk + tg + w where w is the  
income of the immobile factor. The Euler equation, which is a technical condition satisfied for all 
constant-returns-to scale functions, implies w = f(k,g) – fkk – fgg. Using this and equation (3), we  
have that t = fg.   7
for given levels of k and g. If capital is mobile, tax increases induce a more drastic 
decline in demand for the government good than if it is not. The direct effect of a tax 
increase is a reduction in g. This is independent of whether the jurisdiction is autarchic or 
not. The indirect effect, however, occurs only in the case of capital mobility. The 
reduction in g leads to a decline in capital productivity; capital leaves the jurisdiction, 
this reduces the productivity of the government goods and ultimately leads to further 
reductions in g.5 
Before the behaviour of a Leviathan is considered, I will briefly discuss the 
welfare-maximising solution. A benevolent government does not appropriate a rent. 
Thus,  g = t0+tg  and this implies  
y  =  f(k,g) - g - r (k-k0).   (8) 
The optimum is determined by 
fg  =  1.    (9) 
This is not a particularly surprising result. An increase in infrastructure by one unit   
results in a loss of one unit of consumable income. Thus, since the opportunity cost of 
increasing  g  equals one, the marginal benefit must equal one as well. This result is 
independent of whether or not capital is mobile. 
3 The Taming of the Leviathan 
The Leviathan government maximizes the utility function subject to the factor demands 
of the private sector (equations (3) and (4)). The firs-order conditions are  
                         
5   This argument is based on the assumption that fkg>0. If fkg<0, the result is the same. The reduction 
in  g leads to an increase capital productivity and, therefore, an increase in the capital stock.   
This now reduces the marginal productivity of the government good and results in an additional 
reduction in g. 
   8
u1 - u2  =  0,  (10a) 
() 0 g u
dt
dg





 − +   (10b) 
It is assumed here that the objective function is a strictly concave function of the tax  
rate and that boundary solutions can be ruled out.6 It should be noted that t has an   
impact on the allocation of capital, too, but all terms vontaining dk/dt cancel out since fk 
= r and k = k0 ex post. If lump-sum taxation is possible, the optimum is characterised  
by t=1 Moreover, it follows from eq. (4) that fg = 1. Again, it does not matter whether  
or not capital is mobile. The reason ist that even a Leviathan government is interested in 
using efficient tax instruments. The purpose of t is to signal the scarcity of the publicly 
supplied good to the private sector. The tax revenue needed to finance the government’s 
own consumption is generated by a distrotion-free-lump-sum tax. 
Matters are different if the benefit tax is (ab)used to generate the Leviathan’s  
rent. There are at least two explanations as to why this inefficient instrument may be  
chosen. The standard argument in the public-finance literature is that there are binding 
constraints to lump-sum taxation, e.g. due to equity considerations. The alternative 
explanation comes from the public-choice literature. There, it is argued an important 
motive underlying a government’s instrument choice is obfuscation: governments wish  
to disguise the generation of rents through the tax system and, therefore, prefer 
instruments that are non-transparant to the tax payer. This may be another reason as to 
                         
6    In this model, strict concavity of the optimisation problem does not follow from the well- 
behavedness of the utility and production functions. The private sector's first-order conditions are 
binding restrictions. Thus the government's first-order condition contains second derivatives of the 
production function and the second-order conditions contain third derivatives. It can be shown that  
in the case of Cobb-Douglas production and utility functions the second-order conditions are   
satisfied, nevertheless. A proof is available from the author on request.   9
why lump-sum taxes are used so rarely in practice. If there is a constraint on lump-sum 










+ = .     (11) 
The tax rate is now larger than one.7 Thus, the second term on the right-hand side of eq. 
(11) is negative. It follows that the marginal rate of substitution, u2/u1, is less than one. 
If the government raises the tax rate by one unit, the private sector's income is reduced  
by exactly the tax base. However, the public sector's rent is taised by less than the   
tax base since the rise in the tax rate reduces the tax base itself. Thus, a one-unit   
increase in rent-income is accompanied by a more-than-one unit loss of political   
support. 
What happens if we move from autarky to free capital movements? Assume for  
a moment that not only the capital stock but also the tax rate and the demand for the 
government good remain unchanged. Due to the stronger impact of t on g (inequality  
(7)), the left-hand side of equation (11) becomes negative. If the objective function is 
strictly concave, this indicates that the tax rate exceeds than the optimum tax rate. Thus, t 
must be smaller in the case of capital mobility and interjurisdictional competition than  
in the autarky situation. But if t is smaller, g must be larger (see eqs. (6) and (7)). Thus,  
                         
7   To prove this, differentiate the first-order condition for the optimal tax rate t with respect to the 
lump-sum tax t0. This yields 
. 0 g u
dt
dg














It follows the smaller t0, the larger is   u / t . What has been an optimal user fee for a high level of 
lump-sum taxes is now a suboptimal user fee. Thus, the lower the lump-sum tax the larger must 
the user fee be. Since t0 is lower than its optimum level if the restriction on lump-sum taxation is 
binding, the benefit tax rate, t, must exceed one.   10
we conclude that interjurisdictional competition leads to lower tax rates and an 
improvement in the availability of the government goods. The Leviathan has been tamed. 
The private sector of the economy is better off. 
 
Proposition  
If benefit taxes are used to generate rents fot the public sector then factor mobility 
leads to lower fees and an increase in the use of the government good. If this is done 
by lump-sum taxes, factor mobility and autarky produce the same results. 
 
The reason for the taming of the Leviathan is that mobility raises the elasticity  
of demand for public-sector services. Thus, tax increases cause smaller tax-revenue 
increases in the open than in the closed economy. This implies that for the government  
in an open economy it is more expensive in terms of lost political support to increase  
its rent income than in a closed economy. Thus, after a change from autarky to factor 
mobility, each government reduces the tax rate since this now leads to a larger increase in 
the tax base than before. However, since the governments in all jurisdictions do this, 
capital stays where it was and not much happens - except that t is reduced and g is 
increased.  
In contrast to the results established in the traditional tax-competition literature 
with benevolent governments (Wilson [14] and Zodrow and Mieszkowski [15]), 
interjurisdictional competition is socially beneficial in my model. In the traditional 
literature, tax competition ties the hands of a good government: it is forced to provide a 
less-than-optimal amount of public goods. In my model, tax competition ties the hands  
of a bad government: it is forced to redistribute resources from its own members to the 
rest of society.   11
4 Final Remarks  
The central result of this paper is that interjurisdictional competition can be 
advantageous - not for lazy bureaucrats but for those for whom economic policy is   
made. A Leviathan which (ab)uses benefit taxes to generate rent income is tamed by 
factor mobility. However, if other modes of taxation are considered, the redult is 
changed. In the case of distrortion-free lump-sum taxes, calitap mobility has no effect at 
all. If the mobile factor is taxed, the result may even be reversed and the public sector 
may become more inefficient as a consequence of increased openness. See Rauscher  
[11]. Similar results are obtained if the assumption of identical jurisdictions is dropped.  
If jurisdictions are different, there will be gains from trade. These gains raise the   
income of the private sector and, thus, the political support of the government. With 
additional political support, the government has more discretion and is to be expected to 
increase the its rent income. Thus, the optimistic result derived in this paper is not 
generalisable to situations where other tax instruments are used and where jurisdictions 
are not identical.   12
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